From: Dan Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 22:36:53 GMT Subject: [BUG] http: push with token-only URL userinfo fails after libcurl strips creds from CURLINFO_EFFECTIVE_URL Message-ID: Hi, (Please note this was done with the assistance of Claude, I apologize if there are inaccuracies here, Ive tried to go over this and verify as much of it as I am capable of. I tried looking at the mailing list archives to see if this has already been reported and I didnt see anything that looked like it had yet. I can verify that the new libcurl behavior absolutely seems to be causing issues from at least my own limited vantage point. -Dan) Since libcurl stopped returning credentials in CURLINFO_EFFECTIVE_URL (curl 8.23.0, commit 7a6bd027d0de "getinfo: make sure CURLINFO_EFFECTIVE_URL does not contain creds", CVE-2026-94266; also backported to Ubuntu 24.04 as curl 8.5.0-2ubuntu10.16, USN-8932-1), pushing over smart HTTP fails when the remote URL carries a username but no password, e.g. https://@forge.example/owner/repo.git which is a common way for CI tools to pass an access token (Renovate does this for Gitea/Forgejo). Fetch/clone keep working; push does not. Versions -------- git 2.55.0 (1:2.55.0-0ppa1~ubuntu24.04.2) libcurl3t64-gnutls 8.5.0-2ubuntu10.16 -> fails libcurl3t64-gnutls 8.5.0-2ubuntu10.15 -> works (same git build) Server: Forgejo 16.0.6 (answers the first unauthenticated request with 401 + "WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm=...") Reproduce --------- git clone https://@forge.example/owner/repo.git && cd repo git commit --allow-empty -m test GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 git push origin HEAD:refs/heads/test Expected: push succeeds (it did with the previous libcurl). Actual: Pushing to https://forge.example/owner/repo.git warning: redirecting to https://forge.example/owner/repo.git/ POST git-receive-pack (815 bytes) fatal: could not read Username for 'https://forge.example': No such device or address send-pack: unexpected disconnect while reading sideband packet fatal: the remote end hung up unexpectedly No redirect happens on the server side; the server log shows GET info/refs 401 -> GET info/refs 200 -> POST git-receive-pack 401. GIT_TRACE_CURL (abridged, credentials redacted): => Send header: GET /owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack HTTP/2 <= Recv header: HTTP/2 401 <= Recv header: www-authenticate: Basic realm="Gitea" == Info: Issue another request to this URL: 'https://@forge.example/owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack' == Info: Server auth using Basic with user '' => Send header: GET /owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack HTTP/2 => Send header: Authorization: <= Recv header: HTTP/2 200 warning: redirecting to https://forge.example/owner/repo.git/ == Info: [HTTP/2] [5] OPENED stream for https://forge.example/owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack => Send header: POST /owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack HTTP/2 (no Authorization header) <= Recv header: HTTP/2 401 Analysis -------- In http.c, http_request_reauth() calls update_url_from_redirect() with the URL git asked for and CURLINFO_EFFECTIVE_URL. The asked-for URL still contains "@", but libcurl now returns the effective URL without userinfo, so the strcmp() differs and git treats an ordinary 200 as a redirect: it prints "redirecting to ...", rewrites base_url to the credential-less URL and calls credential_from_url(&http_auth, ...) on it, which credential_clear()s http_auth. With a username-only URL, http_auth.password was never set, so init_curl_http_auth() never put CURLOPT_USERNAME/PASSWORD on the handle; the only auth curl had was the userinfo in the URL. Once the URL is rewritten, the POST goes out with no credentials, gets 401, and credential_fill() has nothing to fill from (http_auth was cleared, no helper, no terminal), hence "could not read Username". With "user:password@" in the URL the same false redirect happens, but the push still succeeded in my test - presumably because init_curl_http_auth() had already set CURLOPT_USERNAME/PASSWORD on the reused handle before http_auth was cleared. Possible fix ------------ Compare the URLs without userinfo in update_url_from_redirect() (strip "user[:pass]@" from the asked-for URL, or from both, before the strcmp/skip_prefix), so a credential-free effective URL that is otherwise identical is not treated as a redirect. For a real redirect on the same origin, keeping the existing http_auth instead of re-parsing it from a credential-less URL would also avoid losing the username. I haven't written or tested a patch. Workaround for users: use "user:token@" instead of "token@" in the URL, or provide the token through a credential helper. Thanks, Daniel Spisak