From: Kristoffer Haugsbakk Date: Sat, 23 May 2026 15:17:20 GMT Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 6/8] promisor-remote: trust known remotes matching acceptFromServerUrl Message-ID: <97b9f2cd-7c82-4d4c-b574-31176074e566@app.fastmail.com> In-Reply-To: <20260519153808.494105-7-christian.couder@gmail.com> On Tue, May 19, 2026, at 17:38, Christian Couder wrote: >[snip] > > Let's then use this helper in should_accept_remote() so that, a known > remote whose URL matches the allowlist is accepted. I don’t understand this comma break? > > To prepare for this new logic, let's also: > >[snip] > > Signed-off-by: Christian Couder The rest of the commit message looks good to me. > --- > Documentation/config/promisor.adoc | 74 +++++++++++++++++++ > Documentation/gitprotocol-v2.adoc | 9 ++- > promisor-remote.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- > t/t5710-promisor-remote-capability.sh | 71 ++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/config/promisor.adoc >[snip] > ++ > +Be _VERY_ careful with these patterns: `*` matches any sequence of > +characters within the 'host' and 'path' parts of a URL (but cannot > +cross part boundaries). An overly broad pattern is a major security > +risk, as a matching URL allows a server to update fields (such as > +authentication tokens) on known remotes without further confirmation. > +To minimize security risks, follow these guidelines: > ++ So this introduces a list of precautions to take. > +1. Start with a secure protocol scheme, like `https://` or `ssh://`. > ++ > +2. Only allow domain names or paths where you control and trust _ALL_ > + the content. Be especially careful with shared hosting platforms > + like `github.com` or `gitlab.com`. A broad pattern like > + `https://gitlab.com/*` is dangerous because it trusts every > + repository on the entire platform. Always restrict such patterns to > + your specific organization or namespace (e.g., > + `https://gitlab.com/your-org/*`). > ++ > +3. Never use globs at the end of domain names. For example, > + `https://cdn.your-org.com/*` might be safe, but > + `https://cdn.your-org.com*/*` is a major security risk because > + the latter matches `https://cdn.your-org.com.hacker.net/repo`. > ++ > +4. Be careful using globs at the beginning of domain names. While the > + code ensures a `*` in the host cannot cross into the path, a > + pattern like `https://*.example.com/*` will still match any > + subdomain. This is extremely dangerous on shared hosting platforms > + (e.g., `https://*.github.io/*` trusts every user's site on the > + entire platform). The list seems to end here, because... > ++ > +Before matching, both the advertised URL and the pattern are > +normalized: the scheme and host are lowercased, percent-encoded This next paragraph seems to go back to describing how things work. But this paragraph as well as all of the following ones belong to this list item: 4. Be careful using globs [...] Before matching, [...] The glob pattern can [...] If a remote with the [...] For the security implications [...] promisor.checkFields [...] I don’t know what the intent is. But using an open block will delimit the ordered list. diff --git Documentation/config/promisor.adoc Documentation/config/promisor.adoc index cc728bb0b5e..f07a2e883bd 100644 --- Documentation/config/promisor.adoc +++ Documentation/config/promisor.adoc @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ and to update fields (such as authentication tokens) on known remotes without further confirmation. To minimize security risks, follow these guidelines: + +-- 1. Start with a secure protocol scheme, like `https://` or `ssh://`. + 2. Only allow domain names or paths where you control and trust _ALL_ @@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ guidelines: subdomain. This is extremely dangerous on shared hosting platforms (e.g., `https://*.github.io/*` trusts every user's site on the entire platform). +-- + Before matching, both the advertised URL and the pattern are normalized: the scheme and host are lowercased, percent-encoded >[snip]